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Remarks of Warren E. Burger
Chief Justice of the United States
at the

Dedication of Notre Dame London Law Centre:
The Role of the Lawyer Today
London, England
Friday, July 29, 1983
With this new London Law Centre, Notre Dame University engages in a unique teaching experience - unique at least in the annals of American law schools. It is not just the traditional summer
study of comparative law, but a study of our own law with exposure
for a full school year to the source of all common law legal institutions. This is more than an experiment. It has proven its value.
Since I have been on the bench, I have visited legal institutions
throughout Europe and the Soviet Union to the East, and Japan and
China to the West. Yet, most of my visits have been in the courts of
England. I have had the rich experience of the periodic AngloAmerican Legal Exchanges, long headed by Lord Diplock in England and now by Lord Bridge.
I think I have a better understanding of the richness of our common law heritage from my visits to England, sitting as a guest judge
in the courts and in the Inns of Court - particularly of the Middle
Temple. In more than the quarter of a century that I have been on
the bench, my visits to courts wherever I traveled have given me a
better understanding of how those systems work.
Observation of other systems is essential to improving any system of justice. The elimination of juries in most civil cases in England nearly a half century ago, for example, must have been
influenced in some degree by observing that civil cases tried in courts
on the Continent produced quite as fair results as those with juries in
England. You may have noticed that beginning about ten years ago,
the federal courts in the United States, without any legislation, but
more in the common law tradition by way of local rules, moved to
the use of six-member juries. Today, in all but a few of the 94 federal
districts, this is our practice. This was a true common law
innovation.
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If Sir Thomas More's utopia were achieved, we would not need
lawyers; and without lawyers perhaps we could survive without
judges, or at least with fewer judges. In that ideal setting we would
need even fewer physicians, I suspect, for the stresses that produce
illness would be far less. In that happy state of Thomas More, the
population would be made up of producers, consumers and teachers
- teachers in the broadest sense of that term. There would be no
lawyers, no judges, and no soldiers. But until that society of the
Golden Rule and the Golden Day is achieved, lawyers and judges
will be necessary wherever men and women are gathered in villages,
towns, and cities, and rub shoulders, share boundaries, and deal with
each other daily.
From time to time we should ask, "What is the role of lawyers?"
In this setting, in Notre Dame's London Centre, this question takes
on special significance.
In their highest role, lawyers should be the healers of conflicts
and, as such, should help the diverse parts of a complex, pluralistic
social order function with a minimum of friction. Lawsuits ought to
be the last resort - like war. Learned Hand once said that except
for death or serious illness, he most would fear a lawsuit. President
Abraham Lincoln likewise counseled:
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise
whenever you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is
often a real loser - in fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a
peace-maker the lawyer has a superior opportunity of being a good
man. I
How do we change the trend toward total reliance on courts to
resolve all conflicts? Other methods must be used to resolve disputes, 2 but to do that we must change the attitudes of a good many
lawyers and law teachers. In my law school days it was constantly
put to us that the best service a lawyer could perform was to keep
clients out of courts.
Lawsuits, like wars, often occur because lawyers and statesmen
fail in their role as healers and peacemakers. This healing function
ought to be the primary role of the lawyer in the highest conception
of our profession. Yet we know that members of our profession do
142

1 A. LINCOLN, Note¢for Law Lecture, in II
(J. Nicolay & J. Hay ed. 1894).

COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

2 For further discussion, see National Conference on Causes of PopularDissatzsfaction with the
Administration oflustice, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (L. Levin & R. Wheeler ed. 1979).
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not universally practice according to the highest of our great traditions. In our country, I am bound to say, the current generation of
lawyers, or at least far too many of them, seem to act more like warriors eager to do battle than healers seeking peace. Our society is
indeed a litigious one with more than 600,000 lawyers and over 25
million new lawsuits each year. That gives us one lawyer for every
381 people. With that concentration they can make a great deal of
warfare in the courts. No other society has so many lawyers and so
many lawsuits in relation to its population.
As I see it, several things must be done:
First, the moral basis of law must be emphasized, for without
that foundation the law would be, or it would become, a set of sterile,
mechanical rules, devoid of real meaning in terms of human values.
Second, and closely related, professional ethics must have far
greater attention from the profession. This should begin on the first
hour of the first day in the law school.
Third, standards of civility and decorum are as imperative at
the negotiating table as in the courtroom. This too must begin in the
law schools. Civility must be seen as the coolant of the excessive ardor of the adversary system. I regret to say that civility is in short
supply in our courtrooms, and its importance is far too little mentioned in law schools.
Notre Dame has now carried on the work of a great university
with concern for traditional values for nearly a century-and-a-half.
The London branch of its school of law, with that inspiration and
sponsorship, can lead the way to a more honorable and more effective profession.
We know that lawyers have not always been well regarded by
their contemporaries, and if we are to believe the polls that is still
true today. The literature of the English speaking world is replete
with slurs on lawyers. Typical is the proposal of William Shakespeare, who once gave performances on the balcony of the Middle
Temple dining hall in London, to "kill all the lawyers" as a first step
toward improving society.: We recall that Samuel Johnson's less direct appraisal was similar: Observing the behavior of a barrister,
Johnson stated that, "he did not care to speak ill of any man behind
'4
his back, but he believed the gentleman was an attorney."
We know, of course, that part of this attitude toward our profession flows from the fact that lawyers are most visible in the conflicts
3
4

W.

SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, Part II, Act IV, scene ii, line 86.
S. JOHNSON, BOSWELL'S LIFE OF JOHNSON 126 (L. Powell ed. 1934).
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that arise between other fallible human beings when they are resolved in the courts. There is a certain unfairness in this since lawyers
are not the principals but only the agents of those who are in conflict.
Lawyers become the scapegoats in the play. To a large extent, however, this attitude toward lawyers arises from the way in which some
of them perform their functions, in and out of court. In the Royal
Courts, I have seen some of the most vigorous and effective advocacy
by the most strictly regulated advocates in any free society. There is
nothing incompatible about great advocacy in a system in which the
profession stringently regulates itself.
We lawyers often point with pride to the great achievements of
the legal profession - the countless examples of courageous advocates supporting the claims of people who were subject to the abuse
of governmental power. We remember how John Adams, for example, risked his career, and perhaps even more, to represent the British
soldiers charged with murder in the so-called "Boston Massacre."
Justice Robert Jackson once noted that in every vindication of individual rights and in every advance of human liberty in the history of
free people, lawyers were key actors who were willing to risk their
professional reputations and even their lives in the pursuit of justice.
My colleague Justice Thurgood Marshall is a modern example.
With this new branch of its law school in this setting, Notre
Dame has a rare opportunity to encourage a reexamination of the
moral basis and the jurisprudential assumptions on which our legal
system and our legal education are based. It can begin with the simple truth that the law is a tool, not an end, and that when a rule of
law or procedure does not serve the ends of truth and justice, it
should be changed.
Both truth and justice are essential to a system of law based on
reason. We desperately need a generation of lawyers - and law
teachers - who understand that access to justice does not invariably
mean access to courtrooms. Primitive people who relied on clubs and
stones and brute strength to settle differences can be forgiven for they
were unable to grasp the idea of any other method of dispute resolution. But modern lawyers, educated in great universities and trained
in the law, have no excuse for treating the judicial process as the
primary mode of resolving conflicts. Long ago workers' compensation laws set patterns we have used far too little. No-fault insurance
is struggling to establish a new frontier over the opposition of some
segments of the legal profession.
There are, of course, assumptions underlying the law that are
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fundamental and immutable, but others must be open to refinement
and change. Lawyers should lead in making needed changes.
American law schools perform very well the task of training in
the law and in legal analysis. But a system of legal education that
teaches lawyers the skills of legal thinking and analysis, yet fails to
teach them how to act with civility and according to high professional standards with a commitment to human values, has failed to
perform its mission. Professors L. Ray Patterson and Elliott E.
Cheatham make this observation:
The essential feature of the adversary system is not the law
which it applies, but the way in which it applies the law
...
5
[L]awyers' standards are an integral part of the law itself.
With the Bicentennial of our great Charter just four years away,
our profession should turn back to the sources of our law and of our
way of life as a free people with institutions and government of our
own choice. In the Declaration of Independence, not less than four
times, Thomas Jefferson acknowledged the moral basis of the law
when expressing direct reliance on God as "The Supreme Judge."
And the closing sentence of the Declaration calls for the protection of
divine providence. We need to return to that well for fresh inspiration. Notre Dame's London Law Centre provides a unique opportunity for inquiry into moral concepts that serve as the basis of all law,
even as it challenges long-accepted assumptions and traditions as to
the way in which law is applied.
On our side of the Atlantic, for example, it is considered heresy
by some to question the need for juries in civil cases. Even our modest step of moving to six-member juries in federal courts was challenged by some. It is almost blasphemy to raise questions about the
validity of the adversary system as we practice it. There is no escape
from the reality that the adversary system, and one of its parts, the
lay jury, is not so much a matter of "the law" but rather "the way" in
which the law is applied.
One important idea, long accepted on the English side of the
Atlantic and gaining support on our side, is the taxing of costs to the
losing party in litigation. American courts are flooded with
thousands of cases that should not or need not be there, and cost
shifting might help. Indeed, the volume of frivolous cases is
astounding.
5 L.R. PATTERSON & E.
added).

CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION OF

LAw 109 (1971) (emphasis
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I confess that 40 years ago, and earlier when I was a student, I
would have thought some of these ideas were somewhat heretical.
But as I traveled around the world and visited courts in many, many
countries, questions began to arise in my mind, and I fear that I became more receptive to "alien" ideas than I was in my youth.
I do not advocate that we abandon the jury or that we abandon
the adversary system, but I urge students to ask hard questions and
to look at how other societies deal with these matters.
I give you two concrete examples of my own experience, although in another area of the administration of justice. As I visited
courts and law schools in other countries, I also visited their prisons.
On a visit to the Soviet Union, I was compelled to conclude that the
only correctional institution I was invited to see - a juvenile institution - had training programs in advance over anything I had seen
in other countries. Around the other side of the world, I found that
the prisons we visited in the Peoples' Republic of China were literally
factories with fences around them. The prisoners were trained in
marketable skills by learning to produce goods to help pay for their
incarceration. That surely makes them more likely to become useful
citizens. It is clear to me that there is much that we can learn from
the experiences of other systems of justice and other countries.
If our system of justice cannot stand up under inquiry into the
validity of its methods, it may be too fragile to survive the stresses of
the 21st century. Surely we, who are schooled in the adversary process, should not resist submitting the system itself to adversary examination. Indeed, we lawyers should lead the way.
Some of my criticisms of legal education have met with the response from professors: "We are not running trade schools." Of
course, I do not suggest law deans run "trade schools" in the sense of
training plumbers, electricians, or bricklayers. But I have difficulty
in understanding why a law school should not in many respects parallel the medical school training of physicians and surgeons. Surely a
medical school does not become a "trade school" by teaching the
elements of diagnosis and of surgical procedures.
Lawyers, whether counselors or advocates in the courtroom,
should not have their first exposure to the "nuts and bolts" of the real
world - the law of evidence, for example, or the rules of decorum after they leave law school. Happily, in the past five or ten years, our
law schools have begun to move in the direction of providing students with more exposure to the practical side of the law in the world
they will encounter.
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That the future will bring changes in Notre Dame's London
Law Centre Program, I have no doubt. But the innovative leadership that created it will continue to enlarge and extend it. I would
hope there would be, for example, opportunities for the students to
cross the channel and observe how justice is administered on the
Continent, less than an hour's air travel time from London.
Every law school should inculcate in its students some understanding of the organization and regulation of the profession so they
can challenge and improve that structure. There are serious issues to
be addressed. Our laws strictly regulate monopolies in the private
sector, and our legal profession, which is a monopoly, must be regulated. 6 The choice, and we may be confronted with that choice
before too long, is whether we will continue regulation of the bar by
the profession and our courts, or whether regulation will be imposed
by legislative action. Here again, tngland's experience and procedures offer an excellent guide. In England the profession regulates
itself. Admittedly, in England it is a far simpler matter because England is not subject to a federal system with more than 50 jurisdictions
establishing standards for legal education, admission, and regulation
of the profession. The Notre Dame London Law ,Centre should
study the organization of the legal profession of England.
In no other free country I know of are advocates more rigidly
regulated and disciplined than in England. Yet, that regulation and
discipline comes not from the coercive powers of government, nor
from judges, but from self-imposed standards established and enforced by the profession itself. It is surely not necessary to recall the
qualities of independence, courage, and superb advocacy of the British bar that traces its history back to great figures in the law. Lord
Coke forfeited his position and gambled his head rather than yield
on principles; and Sir Thomas More forfeited both his office and his
head for principle.
To accomplish the kind of legal education I speak of, there must
be a fundamental change in the attitude of some legal educators with
respect to the use of judges and practicing lawyers in the teaching
process. American legal education suffers less today, but still too
much, from a "trade union" attitude that is not entirely hospitable to
the presence in the classroom of members of the practicing bar and
judges.
It is now more than ten years since the Committee of the American Bar Association, chaired by my distinguished late colleague Jus6

See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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tice Tom C. Clark, reported that although we lawyers profess to
regulate and discipline ourselves, by and large discipline of professional misconduct of lawyers in the United States was virtually nonexistent. The Bar Association has labored to correct this, and there
are some small signs of progress. Here our law schools can make a
contribution, for we cannot meet Justice Clark's indictment by any
one segment of our profession acting independently. It must be done
in a working partnership of law teachers, practitioners, and judges.
In a volume of essays published in 1901 entitled A Century of Law
Reform, reviewing changes in England from 1800 to 1900, one of the
accounts relates to the profession itself in which Blake Odgers tells us
this:
Of all the mighty changes that have taken place in the nineteenth century, the greatest change has been in the tone of the administration of both the civil and the criminal law. The manners of
our law courts have marvelously improved. Formerly judges browbeat the prisoners, jeered at their efforts to defend themselves, and
censured juries who honestly did their duty. . . . [C]ounsel bullied
the witnesses and perverted what they said. Now the attitude and
temper of Her Majesty's judges towards parties, witnesses, and prisoners alike has wholly changed, and the Bar too behave like gentlemen. .

.

. [T]hey no longer seek to obtain a temporary victory by

unfair means: they remember that it is their duty to assist the
Court in eliciting the truth. This is due partly to the improved
education of the Bar; partly no doubt to the influence of an omnipresent press; but still more to Her Majesty's judges. If counsel for
the prosecution presses the case too vehemently against a prisoner;
if counsel cross-examining in a civil case pries unnecessarily into the
private concerns of the witness; a word, or even a look, from the
7
presiding judge will at once check indiscretion.
Is it too much to hope that, on our side, we will be able to make
a comparable assessment of the 20th century seventeen years hence?
With this new link to the source of all our law, Notre Dame has
an unparalleled challenge to lead the way.

7 Odgers, Changes in the Common Law and in the Law of Persons, in the Legal Profession, and in
Legal Education, in A CENTURY oF LAW REFORM 41-42 (1901).

